What factors have influenced the way Islam has been understood in (and by) the West?

What factors have influenced the way Islam has been understood in (and by) the West? How have these affected relations between the West and Muslim societies?

To discuss the question above becomes immediately problematical: it suggests a monolithic, homogenous Islam and a monolithic, homogenous West, neither of which exist. Both have profound complexities and diversities (Rane 2010, p.219) and yet this hegemonic construction forms much of the basis of current political debate, cause for conflictand misunderstanding, in the cultural and societal spaces they occupy.

This essay will use the hegemonic to discuss the question: the presumption the Middle East is understood to represent Islam and the US and European positions to represent the West. It will do so froma predominantly post 9/11position; discussing historical factors leading to ‘understandings’ and perceptions of Islam; the cultural theory which underpins and creates understanding; and how these are consequential and demonstrated in the outworking of the political and societal situations of today.

Munoz (1999, pp. 3,4) citing Al-Jabri suggests the dichotomy existing between the West and Islam is a result of misinterpreting history: there has been an interpretation based on the ideology of antagonism; medieval rivalry for political and economic hegemony interpreted as a confrontation between civilisations. This perception of confrontationcan be demonstrated in the European colonisation of the Middle East where coexistence with existing civilisations was dependent on the degree to which they became ‘westernised’. Opposition to this approach was interpreted as hostile causing mistrust of Islam and the perception of an Islamic threat. Munoz (1999,p.3 ) argues Huntingdon’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ arises from and perpetuates this misconception, the assumption complex societies can be considered as monolithic blocks. Saikal (2003, p.69) highlights how these perceptions are maintained and  politicised creating two opposing ‘sides’ by referring to three major issues in which Islam is seen as a factor by the West rather than the social, cultural or political situation which may have contributed: the  Islamic revolution in Iran replacing a pro-US regime; the Palestine – Israel conflict (seen from an Islamic perspective as ignoring the Muslim viewpoint) and the US position in Afghanistan, where a rejection of communism was presumed to mean a desire for westernisation, argued by Saikal to have contributed to 9/11 events.Munoz (1999,p.5) also uses the example of the Iranian revolution to demonstrate how the West has interpreted the event as a ‘fanatical expression of religious fervour’ ignoring the political, economic and social factors which gave rise to it.

Thwaites (2002, p.1) describes culture as ‘the ensemble of social acts where meaning is produced, circulated and exchanged’, from this definition it follows meaning and understanding are culturally based. The cultural positioning of meaning allows for a construction of self-identity, based on a comparative reflection to ‘others’. Foucault argued societies combine the ways of speaking, understanding and believing (expressions of ‘meaning’) into an institutionalised view of their world; a discourse used to maintain social power (O’Shaughnessy &Stadler 2009, pp. 174,175,citing Fiske)- one’s own position is justified by the differences seen in ‘others’.  Based on Foucault’s discourse theory, Said extended the concept of comparison and contrast to ‘Orientalism’, the historical defining of the Muslim world by its distinctions from the West (Rane 2010, p.222). The construction of the other allowed for ‘an invented and imaginative geographical space’; the West represented a dynamic changing society, a nexus of power and knowledge, the Middle East dominated by the Muslim religion ‘a holistically closed system, a social and cultural entity resisting change’  therefore primitive; justifying colonial domination (Jung 2010, p.15). Jung (2010, p. 16) argues  ironically the view held by the radical Islamists  for ‘an all-encompassing, determinate and unchanging cultural identity, intrinsically different from the democratic culture of the West’is precisely the ‘other’ constructed by the Orientalists.

President Bush took great care in post 9/11 America to counsel his countrymen not to vent their hurt and anger on Islam as a religion and in particular against American Muslims ( Shaban 2010, p. 76), a position continued to be articulated by Obama. However, extreme right wing politicians generalised the concept of Islamist to represent all Islam and construct Muslims as a danger and threat to the US. Neocon Daniel Pipes stated after 9/11 that US Muslims included ‘a substantial body of people who wish to transform the US to a nation living under the strictures of a militant Islam’ and ‘the goal of Islam is to replace the Constitution with the Quran’(Shaban 2010, p.83). During his Presidential campaign Obama had to constantly refute allegations he was a Muslim, inferred by opponents from his time in Indonesia with his mother when young and his middle name being Hussein. The fact he had to denounce the claim demonstrates the perception of Islam as a ‘demon’ (Shaban 2010,p.80) and how the religious right in the US used anassociation of Islam to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 to fear monger in the general population; candidates of all persuasions having to assert their Christianity to demonstrate they were not ‘pro Islam’. Mike Huckabee described the battle against jihadists as ‘World War III’, and a theocratic war at that ( Shaban 2010, p.95).Shaban 2011, p.76) argues these examples of extremism uncovered anti – Islamic sentiments that existed for centuries; the position Munoz proposed; enmity arising from misinterpreting  political differences as differences caused by religion.

Events originating from colonisation have caused specific conflicts between the Muslim and Western worlds and these are important to understand in context as they provide the examples upon which both sides form their prejudices. Colonisation was legitimised as bringing ‘modernisation’ to the countries occupied; modernisation being equated to development along western lines and secularisation of society (Ramadan 1999,p. 140), The reality was a protracted colonisation primarily to satisfy the mercantile interests of Europe (Munoz 1999, p.8). Agrama ( 2010, p.500) comments secularisation is an expression of the State’s sovereign power, a process of managing and intervening in religious life and for many is paradigmatic to modern Christianity ( Rippin 2005, p. 180). While some elites within the Muslim world embraced the new world science and technology were going to bring, for most of the populations in the Middle East the step to ‘internalise’ a secular mindset was a step too far, the traditional beliefs, practices and values based on an all of life religion reigned supreme, despite the western view religion was a hindrance to political and social change (Esposito 1999, p.7). The material benefits provided by the modernisation were seen to be available only to the elites, reinforcing a privilege to which the majority of the population were denied access ( Esposito 1999 p.8). In some countries where ‘liberation’ from colonial powers had occurred, the liberators were even harsher, unjust and ruthless against any form of opposition than the colonisers they had replaced (Ramadan 1999, p.141). Munoz (1999, p.8) argues the post – colonial direction for many Muslim societies was to replace religion with nationalism, a new ‘object of worship’ based on building a new developed modern nation state, with Islam only being used when necessary to legitimise politically. However, populations failing to experience benefits from the process and particularly when generational changes brought populations who had not experienced the need to re-establish their own national identity, started to focus on personal identity, culture and faith (Munoz 1999, p.10).

Concern over the degradation of the role of Islam in its societies had existed from the time of the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the domination by European powers, evidenced by the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 by Egyptian schoolteacher Hassan Al Banna. Its basic ideology is opposition to the secularisation and western modernisation of the Islamic Middle East which it perceived as the root of the decay in those societies, believing ‘Islam is the solution’ (Ehrenfeld 2011, p. 71). The internal critique of the direction the Islamic world had taken gained prominence following the failed 1967 war against Israel. The occupation of the West Bank, Sinai, Gaza, Golan Heights and in particular East Jerusalem created a sense of failure not simply for Palestine, but a cause for the whole Muslim world (Esposito 1999, pp. 10,11). Disillusionment created a questioning of the effectiveness of nationalistic ideologies, which had supported western oriented development, and in some cases western allies who persisted in supporting Israel. The impotence of the combined Arab forces struck at the pride, identity and history of the Muslim nations, suggesting secularisation and modernisation had failed, resulting in leaders as autocratic and corrupt as the regimes they replaced, supported by military and secret police, propped up by foreign governments and multinational companies (Esposito 1999, pp. 12,13). From this soul searching came a desire for a more authentic society – less western dependent and based on Arab/ Islamic heritage and values (Esposito 1999, p.11).

Coinciding with the internal desire for more Islamic based societies, events in the 1970’s changed the Middle East’sperception as being completely dominated by the West. In 1973 Egypt’s Sadat launched a ‘holy’ war against Israel, using Islam as the rallying cry rather than Arab nationalism. Although unsuccessful the conflict was seen as a moral victory in the Muslim world. In the same yearthe Arab Oil producing states imposed an embargo on the West, a use of economic power against the military hegemonic of the West. Oil was located in the Arab heartland, the very foundation of Islam and the riches provided were used by the House of Saud to promote preaching and spread of Islam, to support Islamic causes and subsidise activities of Muslim Governments. The embargo forced the West to acknowledge its dependence on the Islamic Middle East and for the Muslim countries this seemed to indicate a return to power from the second class position in a super power world ( Esposito1999, p. 15) .In 1978-79, one of the most modernised western oriented regimes in Middle East was toppled in a revolution, and although carried out by disparate groups and based on the removal of the Shah and the Western trained elite, was seen in the Muslim world as a return to the Golden Age of Islam, the return to a morally just society from failed unjust and oppressive regimes (Esposito 1999, p.16). Munoz (1999, p.15) observes the revolution demonstrated a strong civil society, (argued by political sociologists as requiring a western democracy for existence) – formed in this case by the Islamic clerics with their supporters – were able tooverthrow a weak state.

For many in the West the revival of Islam was seen as a threat to the secularisation and modernisation of the Middle East, and a rejection of the beliefs and values of the West, a ‘dangerous, irrational and counter culture movement’ (Esposito 1999,  p.8). However Esposito (1999, p.17) notes the revival was not a rejection of modernism but was a direct rejection of the dependence on westernisation, secularisation and the systems replacing Islamic values.

For those who had espoused Islam as more than a religion, the experiences of repression, torture and imprisonment, and death gave rise to extremist reactions, (Ramadan 1999, p.141) the politicisation of Islam seen as a necessary role for followers of Qutb and other early jihadists. Subjected to imprisonment and torture by Nasser, Qutb evolved the ideology followed by most Islamists today. Qutb argued jihad, ‘the striving for the faith’ by the believer (Rippin 2005, p.316), should be an armed conflict against the barbarism of those he believed opposed Islam (Armstrong 2010, p.297).

Baker (2010,p.254) argues it is difficult for those in the West to understand the struggle of those in Arab countries living under oppressive authoritarian rule while facing foreign intervention on many fronts. The democracy underpinning the justification for the involvement does not exist for these citizens. Consequently as Sedgwick (2006, pp. 199,200) observes the attraction of Islamism in much of the Muslim world is the lack of an alternative; suffering from poverty, unemployment and corruption (often governmental); for many Muslims, Islamism is seen as the only opposition group with enough strength and conviction to survive state repression.

In 2001 the West experienced terrorism on home soil with the bombings of 9/11 by the radical Islamist group Al Qaeda.Williams (2008, p.179) provides the followingoverview of Al Qaeda. The movement spawned from events originating in 1967 in Egypt, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and Western involvement in the Middle East including the war in Kuwait in 1991, resulting in US forcesremaining in Saudi Arabia, the site of Mecca and Medina, sites holy to the Islamic nation. The occupation regenerated the concept of the Crusader occupation for some in the Islamic world as well as a westernisation of the domestic culture and religion. Consequently, Al Qaeda formulated six stated short term aims: first; Eviction of US forces from Saudi Arabia, second; Eviction of foreign forces from Islamic world, third; Replacement of the Saudi royal family by an Islamic regime, fourth; Replacement of ‘corrupt’ pro- western regimes in region (Egypt, Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, fifth; upport for Palestine against Israel and finally support for other Islamist causes in Chechen and Thailand. All of these objectives are based on the removal of western political social and cultural influences not statements based on religious domination.

Tragically, this action more than any other provided the means for similar extremists in the West to reject the Muslim world as ‘an all-encompassing social system to be understood within the framework of an emerging modernisation’ (Jung 2010, p.27) and to portray it as primitive, ‘violent to the core’(Shaban 2010, p.77) seeking destruction of the West, a role taken up by a simplifying caricaturing media (Esposito 1999, p.149). In a society where much of the world views are constructed from thirty second television grabs, language is powerful. Marshallsay (2004, p. 2) notes lack of knowledge of the distinction between ‘Islamist’ and ‘Islamic’ causes a blind generalisation; they are simplistically assumed to refer to the same concepts, linking the entire Muslim world to the extreme actions of a few who do not speak for the whole.

This essay has intentionally focussed on the public perceptions of Islam in the West, rather than the incredibly complex political position. By definition perceptions are not justified knowledge, but beliefs formed by immediate impressions. There is no doubt intelligent, informed and rational people in politics, society, and religion on both sides of this divide genuinely seek better relationships. The argument presented in this essay is that the historical misunderstandings raised by Munoz, the ‘othering’ noted by Said, the Muslim response to decades of brutal colonialism or dictatorships has created a simplistic view in the West of Islam representing a ‘backward’ , anti- democratic, anti- western force, united by a religion to be enforced on all. Images of development, progress for women, movements for democracy are rarely seen on western media, rather images of destruction, terrorism and revolution are regularly used, reinforcing the notions of a brutal, extreme and primitive society. From the time of colonisation the overriding presumption has been any society embarking on modernisation must therefore want westernisation and secularisation to accompany it. When this dominant hegemonic is rejected due to disastrous outcomes and the desire to maintain the culture and practices of centuries, it is interpreted as a threat to democracy and the values being imposed. There is no avoiding the damage extremists have created in the West in appalling attacks; sadly the greatest damage has been to the reputation of the majority of Muslims who reject their position and tactics. The recent events of the Arab Spring will force the West to reconsider its understanding of the Middle East; the influence and dominance of alliances supporting the westernisation of much of the region has changed and despite the assumption from the west this would mean a movement to radical Islamism, this does not seem to be the wish of the general publics. One can only hope the ignorance and prejudice which has existed on both sides can be replaced by informed, educated and respectful dialogue from all parties.

References

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